

**IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCEPT OF RELIGIOUS  
MODERATION IN PRIVATE ISLAMIC HIGHER EDUCATION (PIHE)**

**IMPLEMENTASI KONSEP MODERASI BERAGAMA DI LINGKUNGAN  
PERGURUAN TINGGI KEAGAMAAN ISLAM SWASTA (PTKIS)**

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**Abstract**

This paper discusses the application of Religious Moderation (RM) in Private Islamic Higher Education (PIHE). This research focuses on tracing the level of understanding of the academic community towards the RM concept, its implementation and internalization strategy, and exploring the factors that influence its implementation. This research used a mixed-method, descriptive analysis, and an interdisciplinary approach. The samples comprised 60 PIHE. There was consisted of Kopertais I, II, and IV areas with 153 respondents. The data were collected by questionnaires, interviews, observation, and documentation techniques. The results showed; First, the academic community's understanding of the RM concept is at a low level. Second, the implementation of RM is at a fairly good level. The strategies used to internalize RM are the insertion into courses, training/workshops/seminars, incorporating RM into the curriculum, and extracurricular activities. Third, the factors that influence the implementation of RM consist of internal and external factors. Among the internal factors are campus leadership support, literacy, campus community participation, budget funds, and availability of infrastructure. Meanwhile, external factors are government support, religious and community leaders, social, economic, and political conditions, the education level of the community around campus, and information and communication technology. The level of support from all factors is classified as lacking and tends to be very lacking. Therefore, it cannot encourage the RM implementation process properly and maximally.

**Keywords:** Implementation, Religious Moderation, PIHE, Kopertais

**Abstrak**

*Tulisan ini membahas tentang penerapan Moderasi Beragama (MB) di lingkungan Perguruan Tinggi Keagamaan Islam Swasta (PTKIS). Riset ini fokus pada penelusuran tingkat pemahaman civitas akademika terhadap konsep MB, implementasi dan strategi internalisasinya, dan penelusuran faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi pelaksanaannya. Penelitian ini menggunakan mix method, analisa deskriptif, dan pendekatan interdisipliner. Sampel terdiri dari 60 PTKIS yang berada di wilayah Kopertais I, II, dan IV dengan jumlah responden 153 orang. Data-data dikumpulkan dengan teknik kuesioner, wawancara, observasi dan dokumentasi. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan; Pertama, pemahaman civitas akademika terhadap konsep MB berada pada level kurang. Kedua, pelaksanaan MB berada pada level cukup baik. Adapun strategi yang digunakan untuk internalisasi MB adalah insersi ke dalam mata kuliah, pelatihan/workshop/seminar, memasukkan MB ke dalam kurikulum, dan melalui kegiatan ekstrakurikuler. Ketiga, faktor yang mempengaruhi penerapan MB terdiri dari faktor internal dan eksternal. Di antara faktor internalnya adalah dukungan pimpinan, literasi, partisipasi warga kampus, pendanaan, dan ketersediaan sarana prasarana. Sementara faktor eksternal berupa dukungan pemerintah, tokoh agama dan masyarakat, kondisi sosial, ekonomi dan politik, tingkat pendidikan masyarakat sekitar kampus, dan teknologi informasi dan komunikasi. Tingkat dukungan dari semua faktor tergolong kurang dan cenderung sangat kurang. Sehingga tidak mampu mendorong proses implementasi MB secara baik dan maksimal.*

**Kata Kunci:** Implementasi, Moderasi Beragama, PTKIS, Kopertais

## INTRODUCTION

Legally and formally, the efforts to disseminate the concept of Religious Moderation (RM) in Private Islamic Higher Education (PIHE) have been carried out by the Indonesian Ministry of Religion through the Directorate General of Islamic Education. The effort to develop the concept of RM is by issuing the Director General's Circular, which contains the House of Religious Moderation (HRM), dated October 29, 2019 (Hefni, 2020). On March 12, 2021, Decree No. 897 concerning the Technical Guidelines for the House of Religious Moderation. HRM will be used as a place for seeding, developing, socializing, and internalizing RM values within PIHE.

This policy responds to the increasing tensions of exclusivity, intolerance, radicalism, and extremism in the higher education environment. The Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) verified that the radical movement had targeted campuses in the context of Islamization and indoctrination of radicalism to recruit cadres by utilizing student discussions and organizations. Almost 86% of students from five universities on the island of Java reject the ideology of Pancasila and want the enforcement of Islamic law (Saidi, 2016).

The Alvara Research Center survey found students tend to understand intolerance and radicalism. It showed the percentage of students who do not support non-Muslim leaders by 29.5%; 23.5% agree with the Islamic state; 17.8% of those agree with the caliphate. The National Counterterrorism Agency noted that seven state universities were exposed to radicalism (Litbang, 2018). The State Intelligence Agency also mentioned that 39% of students in 15 provinces were exposed to radicalism (Institute, 2019).

Setara Institute's research on ten state universities in Indonesia also showed an increase in the exclusivity of discourse and student movements driven by groups, such as *Salafi-Wahabi*, *Tarbiyah*, and *Tahririyah*. The antagonistic discourses developed to foster exclusivity among students included the issue of Muslim oppression, conspiracies against Islam, and *ghazw al-fikr* (war of thought). In spreading the discourse, they use the campus mosque as a base. While the medium of indoctrination is through studies, sermons, *liqā'*, cycles, *halaqah*, and a cadre of members regularly (Institute, 2019).

The disbandment of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Front Pembela Islam (FPI) did not reduce the frequency of exclusivity and extremity of Islamic discourse and movements in universities. By using new faces and platforms, this group continues to spread narratives of intolerance and anti-government among students. The non-stop penetration of intolerance caused by the blazing spirit of Islam is not matched by deep religious literacy, blind group fanaticism, strict supervision system from mentors (*murabbi*), and the roots of the movement that were planted long before they entered college. Hasan et al. (2018) said that the seeds of exclusivity and extremity had been planted since they were in school through the reading materials they consumed. The reading materials interested in high school and college students are books produced by groups with *tahriri* and *tarbawi* ideologies.

According to Ulinuha & Nafisah (2020), RM is believed to be a solution for exclusivity and extremity. RM requires a point of view, attitude, and behavior that always takes the middle side (*tawassuṭ*), acts fairly (*i'tidāl*), is balanced (*tawāzun*), tolerant (*tasāmuḥ*), and does not extremes in religion (Kemenag,

2019). By embodying these understandings, attitudes, and behaviors, students will be able to live side by side with each other in a good and civilized manner. It is no exaggeration if since 2020, the Director General of Islamic Education has issued a policy to enforce RM within Islamic higher education. It's just that the findings of some of the research above show that these policies have not had a positive impact. Even exclusivism and extremism on campus, especially among students, still seem to be growing.

The question is, has the RM concept proclaimed by the Ministry of Religion been well understood and captured by the academic community, especially Private Islamic Higher Education (PIHE)? Has RM been implemented in the Private Islamic Higher Education? What are the factors that influence its implementation? These questions need answers through research to ensure the effectiveness of their implementation.

The research on implementing RM in PIHE is essential for several reasons. First, quantitatively, the number of PIHE is higher than State Islamic Higher Education (SIHE). The total of SIHE is 58 institutions, while PIHE is 805 institutions. According to Education Management Information System (EMIS) Islamic Higher Education data, PIHE students for the odd semester 2020/2021 were recorded at 429,456 people at the S-1 level, 11,364 at the S-2 level, and 894 people at the S-3 level (Pendis, 2021). In the manner of a large number, the role of PIHE will determine the success of the RM agenda.

Second, SIHE has a clear line of coordination with the Ministry of Religion, so its policies and movements are easy to control and

evaluate. In contrast to PIHE, which, although formally is under the guidance of the Ministry of Religion, in reality, it does not receive direct and full attention from the Ministry of Religion, PIHE relies more on the role of foundations and independent business charities. Therefore, the level of autonomy is higher, including the autonomy of the curriculum and academic culture. Third, research related to RM implementation takes most SIHE samples very rarely, or no research specifically enters the PIHE locus.

## RESEARCH METHODS

This paper is the result of research on implementing of the Concept of Religious Moderation in the PIHE Environment. The campuses studied are located in the area of the Coordinator of Private Islamic Higher Education or called *Kordinatorat Perguruan Tinggi Keagamaan Islam Swasta* (Kopertais) region I (Jakarta and Banten), II (West Java), and IV (East Java), with a total population of 379 campuses.

The sampling technique used purposive by considering: (1) the geographical location of the campus; urban and rural areas, (2) institutional forms, Islamic Institute of Religion, Faculty of Islamic Religion, and Islamic College, and (3) affiliation of organizations, and (4) institutional accreditation status. From these criteria, 60 campuses were selected or equivalent to 15.8% of the total 379 PIHE (Arikunto, 2002). In detail, Kopertais I 18 institutions (27%) from 65 campuses, Kopertais II 20 institutions (13%) from a total of 152 campuses, and Kopertais IV as many as 22 institutions (13%) from a total of 162 campuses. From each campus, 2-3 respondents were taken, bringing the total to

153 people. Respondents are representatives of the leadership, lecturers, teaching staff, and students.

The research was conducted for three months, from September to November 2021. The data collection techniques were questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, indirect observations, and documentation studies. Initial data obtained from questionnaires and document studies were explored and verified through interviews and observations. This study used a mixed method. The research data were analyzed descriptively, starting from data reduction, categorization, and inference.

The assessment criteria and variable measurement scales refer to Riduwan (2010). The interval score for 81-100%=very applied/very good, 61-80%=applied/good, 41-60%=moderately applied/fairly good, 21-40%=less applied/poor, 0-20%=very not implemented/not good. In addition, an interdisciplinary approach is also used to sharpen the analysis of the discussion.

## **RESULTS OF RESEARCH AND DISCUSSIONS**

### **The Concept of Religious Moderation at PIHE**

In this study, three keywords need to be defined: implementation, religious moderation, and Private Islamic Higher Education (PIHE). Linguistically, implementation means implementation and application (KBBI, 2020). According to Purwanto & Sulistyastuti (1991), implementation is an activity to distribute policy outputs (to deliver policy outputs) carried out by implementers to the target group to realize policies.

In the context of this research, implementating RM is enforcing policies carried out by PIHE actors to apply the RM concept on their respective campuses. The implementing actors are the entire academic community, from leaders, lecturers, students, and education staff.

Etymologically, religious moderation consists of two words: moderation and religion. Moderation is reducing violence and avoiding extremes (KBBI, 2020). Meanwhile, religion is teaching that regulates the procedures for faith and worship of God and becomes the rules of human association with humans and their environment (KBBI, 2020). Religious means a way of understanding and practicing religious teachings in everyday life.

In a book published by the Indonesian Ministry of Religion, it is stated that religious moderation is a perspective, attitude, and behavior that always takes a middle position, always acts fairly and is not extreme in religion (Kemenag, 2019). These definitions are used in this study. Meanwhile, there are four indicators used to measure the implementation of RM on campus: 1) national commitment, 2) tolerance, 3) non-violence, and 4) accommodating to local culture (Kemenag, 2019). The model and implementation strategy will see these four indicators in the PIHE environment.

While Law No. 12 of 2012 states that private higher education are universities established and organized by the community. According to Abbas (2009), higher education is an educational institution that organizes higher education processes, including Colleges, Polytechnics, Institutes, or Universities. Thus, Private Islamic Higher Education (PIHE) is Islamic higher education institutions established and organized by the

community, using legal entities, foundations, associations, or other forms under statutory regulations.

### Understanding of RM Concepts

Understanding means being smart, and knowing very well about something (KBBI, 2020). According to Mulyasa (2005), understanding is an individual's cognitive and affective depth. Meanwhile, according to Bloom (1956), there are several indicators of understanding: interpreting, exemplifying, classifying, summarizing, inferring, comparing, and explaining. In this study, only the understanding aspect at the level of explaining ability was measured. Can the PIHE academic community explain the RM concept in terms of definition and indicators?

Regarding the question about the definition of RM, 49% of respondents answered very well, 12% were good, 19% were moderate, 13% did not know, and 7% did not know. Regarding the ability to explain the RM indicator, 19% of respondents can answer very well, 21% good, 36% fairly good, 11% do not know, and 13% do not know. Several factors cause the low understanding of the PIHE community toward the RM indicator. First, the distribution of RM books published by the Ministry of Religion has not been evenly distributed to all PIHEs, so their sources of reading are research results in scientific journals that do not contain these indicators. It can be seen, for example, in Adiba's confession (interview, 27 October, 2021). According to her:

"I do not know and do not memorize all the indicators of religious moderation because I do not know that the Ministry of Religion publishes a moderation book. So far, I have heard from lecturers and read about it through writings in journals, and I did not find that indicator."

Second, the academic community's interest in reading the RM concept is low. The low interest in reading is due to the instant and pragmatic culture that has plagued the academic community, especially students. Third, some view RM as a religious liberalization project. It is reflected in a student's admission at one of the PIHE in West Java. He said:

"Frankly, I don't know the definition and indicators of religious moderation. I'm also reluctant to read articles about it because I think it (religious moderation) is part of the religious liberalization project. Our religion is already moderate; what else should be moderated." (Abdullah, Interview, October 8, 2021)

Fourth, the RM issue is considered less important for the millennial generation in the digital era. Saifulah mentioned that strengthening the fields of entrepreneurship, artificial intelligence, and digital literacy are needed in this era.

"This issue of religious moderation is not contextual for our generation who lives in the digital era. We should be given reinforcement about the business world, digital literacy, artificial intelligence, and the like. So that we can win competitions that are no longer manual but all digital." (Saifullah, Interview, October 15, 2021)

From the information above, it is known that the cause of the low understanding of the PIHE academic community towards the RM concept is due to two factors, namely internal factors and external factors (Aqib, 2002). External factors in the form of environmental influences and reading materials. Regarding environmental factors, the researchers found differences between PIHE, affiliated with mass organizations, such as NU and Muhammadiyah, and those affiliated with the *Salafi-Ikhwani*. The academic community in the PIHE NU/Muhammadiyah environment tends to accept the RM concept. In contrast,

those affiliated with the *Salafi-Ikhwani* tend to be exclusive, reject the RM concept, and consider it part of the religious liberalization project.


As for reading materials, there are indeed differences between PIHE domiciled in rural and urban areas. Not many in rural areas can explain the definition and indicators of RM, while the number who can answer it in urban areas is much higher. Therefore, efforts are needed from the Ministry of Religion to distribute information as widely as possible so that the RM concept can reach all levels of the academic community, both in cities and villages.

Meanwhile, internal factors are caused by low interest in reading and the packaging of the RM concept, which is less “up-to-date”, so it cannot appeal to the tastes of millennials and generation Z who live in the digital era. Regarding reading interest, the writer’s findings in the field show a very low level. Let alone reading books on religious moderation, they are reluctant to read course books. The culture of copy-pastes and OIM (observe, imitate, modify) is rampant on almost all campuses. The plagiarism tests implemented on several campuses also did not discourage copy-pastes and OIM habits; in fact, some students, by using specific applications, could “modify” the results of the plagiarism check as desired.

Regarding packaging, RM issues are also important to consider. The most targets for implementing the RM policy are millennials and Generation Z, who have instant and pragmatic characters. Therefore, the issues raised in the discussion and socialization. The RM must be packaged attractively with digitalized, fun, and eye-catching packaging.

In case all aspects of understanding the meaning and indicators of RM are combined, the result is 34% is very good, 12% is good, 27% is fairly good, 17% is less good, 10% is not good as can be seen in the following figure:

**Figure 1.** Understanding of RM Concepts



Source: Processed by researcher

Figure 1 shows that the majority of respondents who understand very well are 34%. If referring to Riduwan (2010) assessment criteria, this percentage is equivalent to a bad score because it is in the range of 21% -40%. Considering the value of understanding the RM concept is still at a poor level, a particular strategy is needed so that the RM concept in the future can attract the interest of the PIHE academic community, especially students. Among the strategies that can be developed through socialization and dissemination through seminars, workshops, training, reading and writing competitions, podcasts, short films, and RM flyer designs nationally, exhibitions of Indonesian cultural products reflect RM’s spirit.

### **Implementation of the Concept of RM**

The measurement of the implementation of the RM concept on the PIHE campus used four indicators contained in the RM book of the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia (2019): national commitment, tolerance, non-violence, and respect for

local culture. The extent to which these four indicators are understood, interpreted, responded to, and implemented within the PIHE environment. The details of the findings and analysis are explained as follows.

### **National Commitment**

In this indicator, there are eight questions asked to the respondents. The eight questions can be classified into three. There were related state basis of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, democratic system with all its derivatives, such as elections, and attitudes towards the symbol of the state (the red and white flag).

Regarding the question of Pancasila as the final state basis, respondents answered strongly agree by 73.2%; agree by 19.6%, quite agree by 5.2%; disagree by 0.1%, and 1.3% strongly disagree. Regarding the 1945 Constitution as the basis of the state constitution, as many as 69.9% of respondents answered strongly agree, 22.2% answered agree, 4.6% quite agree, 1.3% disagree, and 2% strongly disagree. It shows that the national commitment of the PIHE academic community towards Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution is quite good.

The reason for agreeing with Pancasila and 1945 Constitution is because they result from an agreement with components nation. In the language of religion, Pancasila is the sentence of *sawā'*, which can unite and unite all the diversity in Indonesia. Because it is a mutual agreement, it is the same as a promise that must be kept and not be betrayed. It is as Syamsukadi said (October 17, 2021):

“Pancasila is the result of the agreement of all components of the nation’s founding. Because it has been agreed upon as the basis of the state, we must guard it and not

betray Pancasila. Betraying him is the same as breaking a promise. Breaking a promise is forbidden by religion.”

Regarding the democratic system, 54.2% of respondents answered strongly agree, 26.8% agree, 11.1% quite agree, 5.2% disagree, and 2.6% strongly disagree. Approval of the democratic system because it is considered not contrary to Islam. Although not the same, the democratic system accommodates the basic principles of governance in Islam, such as *as-syūrā* (consultation), *al-'adālah* (justice), *al-musāwāh* (equality), *al-ḥurriyah* (freedom).

In the matter of respecting the red-white flag, there are 61.4% of respondents strongly agree and have implemented it. However, there are still 25.5% who agree, 7.8% quite agree, and 2.6% disagree and strongly disagree. Respondents who strongly disagree were confirmed to have never carried out a flag ceremony.

Among the reasons for disapproval and unwillingness to respect the flag is because it is considered an act of associating partners with God, or at least placing the object (flag) in a noble position beyond the glory of the Kaaba and the holy land. Some argue that respecting the flag is the same as *tasyabbuh* (resembling) the actions of the infidels.

Respondents who answered strongly disagree and have never carried out the flag salute are those who have a line towards literalist groups, such as *ikhwanī*, *tahrirī*, and also extreme Wahabi-*Salafi*. The reason that respecting the flag is the same as associating partners with God or culting objects and *tasyabbuh* with infidels is a typical argument of puritan-extremist groups. Sheikh al-Albani and Sheikh Ibn Baz have issued a fatwa regarding the prohibition of respecting the flag because it resembles the actions of

infidels and can damage faith (Ibn Baz, 2005; al-Albani, 2005).

Other findings show that 29.4% of respondents strongly agree with Islamic law as the state's formal ideology, 18.3% agree, 15% quite agree, 17.6% disagree, and 19.6% strongly disagree. In this aspect, the national commitment of the PIHE community looks very bad. Among the arguments that desire Islamic law as the state ideology is that historically freedom fighters and the majority of the population in Indonesia are Muslims. Some think that Islam is a religion that has the concepts of *al-walā'* (loyal) and *al-barā'* (freedom) so that it is clear who is friend and enemy (Interview with several PIHE lecturers in Kuningan, Bogor, Surabaya, and Bandung on 15-17 October 2021).

As observed, their arguments are exclusive by monopolizing and imposing the truth on others. To say that Indonesian Muslims are the majority and therefore may demand that Shari'a be applied as the state ideology is an unwise and ahistorical attitude. It is said to be unwise; the majority and minority paradigms are no longer relevant as the basis for the system of relations between citizens. All citizens have the same position. In their status as citizens (*al-muwāṭin*), all country residents have the same rights and obligations according to the rules in force in the Republic of Indonesia, regardless of their religious, social, and economic status.

It is said to be historical because history has proven that those who fought for Indonesia's independence were all components of the nation consisting of various ethnic groups, religions, and groups. Historically it is also recognized that Pancasila is the result of a mutual agreement agreed upon by the nation's founding fathers. What is agreed

together is the same as a promise. Religion forbids its people from betraying the agreement.

It is also not appropriate for the concepts of *al-walā'* and *al-barā'* as an argument for applying Islamic law. This concept must be placed proportionally and contextually. Not all problems can use *al-walā'* and *al-barā'*. Scholars debate its use in the context of theology –as did the Wahhabis-. Mainly if *al-walā'* and *al-barā'* are applied in the context of *mu'amalah siyāsīyah*. Of course, it is dangerous because the *mu'amalah* aspect is dynamic and flexible according to space and time. Especially in the context of a peaceful and plural nation state like Indonesia, the application of *al-walā'* and *al-barā'* is irrelevant.

Regardless of the debate above, in general, this indicator of national commitment is quite good because the implementation of RM is at the level of 52%, and only 8% is not well implemented. Despite being fairly good, several crucial issues regarding the desire to make Islamic law a state ideology and the refusal to respect the flag still need special attention.

### **Tolerance**

Tolerance is an attitude of giving space and not interfering with the rights of others to have beliefs, express their beliefs, and express opinions, even though it is different from what we believe. Tolerance is always accompanied by respect, accepting different people as part of us, and positive thinking (Kemenag, 2019).

In this context, religious tolerance is the focus of this study, within internal Islam and interreligious, both related to social and political tolerance. Two aspects measured

the tolerance level of the PIHE academic community; eight questions were asked with the following findings.

Regarding internal Islam tolerance, in cases of obstructing worship of other people from different schools of thought, for example, 64.7% of respondents answered never at all, 20.9% never, 7.2% once in a while, 4.6% often interfered, and 2.6% very often hinder the worship of other people from different schools of thought. Meanwhile, in the case of prayer services where there is a difference in *madhhab* between the priest and the congregation, 43.1% were found to be very obedient to the priest, 22.9% obedient, and 15.7% did not obey the priest's movement by doing *mufāraqah* (separation) from the priest.

The factor causing the low tolerance in this second case is the lack of knowledge about *fiqh al-ikhtilāf* and the homogeneity of campus residents. Therefore, for campuses that apply for *muqāranah al-mazāhib* courses and consist of various ethnic groups and groups, the response to differences in worship procedures is very positive and mutually respectful. While campuses that do not apply *muqāranah al-mazāhib* and their residents are homogeneous, the response to differences in worship practices tends to be negative and counterproductive.

As for the aspect of interreligious tolerance, especially on the social aspect, the PIHE community is very tolerant. It is proven by the attitude and willingness to help victims of COVID-19 who are non-Muslims. 60.1% said it helped very often, 23.5% often helped, 9.2% had helped, 2.6% never helped, and 4.6% very never helped.

The good tolerance level, in this case, is due to three factors there were psychological,

medical, and sociological factors. Psychologically, COVID-19 sufferers need support. Therefore, the safety and recovery of victims are prioritized. Covid-19 is a pandemic with a high-speed transmission rate (Supriatna, 2020). Sociologically, the Indonesian people are known as a nation with a very high level of concern and generosity (CAF, 2021). At this point, it is not surprising that the social tolerance of the PIHE community to Covid-19 victims is quite good.

In the case of the election of non-Muslim public leaders, the tolerance level is quite good. It is evidenced by the presence of 29.4% of respondents who strongly disagree, 26.8% do not mind, 20.9% moderately object, 13.1% object, and 9.8% strongly object. The arguments for accepting non-Muslim leaders are, first, the disclosure of public information about the candidate's track record. Second, the candidate generally has a high level of nationalism.

In case the data is analyzed using two typologies of religious tolerance, namely passive and active tolerance (Casram, 2016). The practice of tolerance in PIHE can be categorized as follows: First, intra-religious tolerance related to differences in *madhhab* in worship, both participatory and non-participatory, is quite adequate. Nice and passive. While the social humanity, the level of tolerance is quite good and active. As for political issues, the level of tolerance is not good and passive.

Second, social tolerance between religions is good and active. The academic community is proactively involved in social work issues with the non-Muslim community. Meanwhile, tolerance of aspects of theology and worship is classified as poor and passive.

The percentage of tolerance indicator is seen as a whole. Then the majority is at the highest at 46% and the lowest value at 6%. This figure shows that tolerance application in the PIHE environment is quite good.

### **Anti Violence**

Anti-violence can be interpreted as rejecting other forms of violence (Rubini, 2018; Huraerah, 2012). In this research, anti-violence is the rejection of all forms of violence, whether physical, psychological, or symbolic. It can be verbal and non-verbal violence. To determine the extent of the implementation of anti-violence in the PIHE environment. This study asked the respondents seven questions. The seven questions can be clustered into questions related to individual and communal violence, verbal and non-verbal, socio-religious and political-religious violence.

Respondents generally agree that violence is a bad act and should be avoided. It's just that related to specific cases; the answers vary widely. For example, when asked about acts of violence against people who insult religion, 50.3% answered that they had never done it, 24.8% never, 14.4% had, and 10.4% often did. The result found the same answer in cases of violence against people who insulted themselves and their families. 43.1% answered very never, 23.5 never, 22.2% ever, and 11.1% often.

In the two cases above, it is seen that violent behavior in responding to theological and social issues is very low. Thus, it can be said, the culture of non-violence in cases like this is quite good. It's just that PIHE must remain vigilant because there is still potential for violence, which is quite a number, 10.4% in the theological aspect and

11.1% in the sociological aspect. Suppose the PIHE campus, especially its leadership, cannot properly manage a culture of anti-violence. In that case, it is not impossible that this potential will soar and is certainly very worrying for the conducive life of the academic community and the surrounding community.

Regarding acts of violence to change the socio-political system based on religious incentives, 57% answered strongly never, 25% never, 12% ever, and 7% often did. Then in cases of verbal violence, especially on social media, it was found that 72% had never done it at all, 14% had never, 8% had occasionally, and 6% had often used verbal violence. Meanwhile, in the case of differences in *madhhab*, ethnicity, and class, as many as 66.7% never commit violence, 26.1% do it occasionally, and 7.2% do it often, but the tension and frequency are rare.

Although the percentage is 7.2%, vigilance against cases of politicization of religion also needs to be increased. Most respondents who answered that they had committed violence for socio-political change came from campuses that were pro-political Islam movements. The gubernatorial election event in Jakarta in 2017 proves that the politicization of religion can ignite violence, even among educated people. Like a fire in the husk, if it is not extinguished immediately in a structured and orderly manner, then the fire may enlarge and burn what is around.

In the example of cases of verbal violence, especially on social media. It was found that as many as 72% of respondents claimed to have very never done verbal violence in social media rooms, 14% had never done verbal violence, 8% had occasionally, and 6 % admitted to frequent verbal abuse. Seeing

the massive use of social media today, the number of anti-violence cases above is still relatively good. Indeed, there are still 8% who have done violence and 6% who often use verbal violence. It happens because the campus does not have a reliable instrument to control the use of social media.

Several PIHE has implemented regulations regarding ethics and academic culture along with their obligations and sanctions, but these are less effective. Because the campus does not have an application that can control all social media accounts owned by each individual, the content they upload cannot be directly controlled by the campus. In addition, the massive amount of news and violent content -whether in games, news, or tutorials- on social media also influences the attitudes and culture of violence in the academic community at PIHE.

In case these data are analyzed using the peace education paradigm developed by Saleh (2012). Accordingly, implementing of anti-violence in PIHE can be classified as follows: First, physical violence. The number of violence that occurred was 31 cases. Physical violence is classified as low. The low number of cases of physical violence shows that an anti-violence culture can be appropriately implemented – the second psychological violence. The data collected were 57 cases of harsh words, ridicule, body shaming, and bullying, either directly in the real world or in cyberspace (cyberbullying). In this case, the culture of anti-violence on the PIHE campus is low.

Third symbolic violence. Symbolic violence is non-physical violence by imposing specific group culture on other groups. Symbolic violence arises from the class structure in society (Ulya, 2016) so that the dominant

class dominates the sub-dominant party by attacking and determining their way of thinking, seeing, feeling, and acting (Haryatmoko, 2007). On-campus, violence like this often occurs. For example, lecturers, with their social and symbolic capital, threaten not to give grades if students don't do their homework. In the other case, senior student ultimatum their juniors if they arrive late at the Introduction to Campus Academic Culture. For this symbolic violence, there are 64 cases with various levels and types.

The accumulated results of all anti-violence sub-indicators, there are 53% do not commit violence, and 5% do so often. This data shows that the anti-violence culture is quite good. Therefore, it needs to be improved. Among the ways to improve it are minimizing gaps, increasing awareness about equality, and fostering a spirit of togetherness and mutuality among campus residents. The enforcement of sanctions against perpetrators of violence also needs to be done consistently. Habitual activities that cultivate the spirit of brotherhood and friendliness also need to be reproduced and intensified.

### ***Accommodating Local Culture***

Accommodating local culture means religious practices and behaviors willing to accept the local culture. Religious traditions that are not rigid, among other things, are marked by a willingness to accept religious practices and behaviors that do not merely emphasize normative truths. It also accepts religious practices based on virtue, of course, as long as these practices do not conflict with the principles in the teachings of religion (Kemenag, 2019).

In this research, two clusters of questions are asked: related to the old culture in the community and the new culture currently penetrating. In the first aspect, they were asked about the culture of cooperation and mutual assistance. As many as 94.3% answered that they had done it actively, while 5.7% said they had not done it consistently.

Those active in cooperation argue that this culture is excellent and has successfully brought Indonesia into a harmonious and friendly nation. While those who do not do so, there must be innovations by developing other cultures that are relevant in the current era. Of course, the argument of this second group is very weak because cooperation and mutual assistance are ancestral cultures that are very noble and compatible with Islamic teachings, also always in line with the pulse of the times. So even if there is a new cultural innovation, it does not have to replace the old culture, which is still very good and relevant.

Another question was about the traditions of *tahlilan*, *yasinan*, *salametan*, and *walimahan*. There are 79% very often, 16% often, 3% have done, and 2% never did. The data shows that most of the PIHE academic community agree and often carry out this tradition. Their reasons for doing so are: First, it is believed that the tradition does not conflict with the main teachings of Islam. Second, there are many theological, social, economic, and psychological benefits. Third, carrying out this tradition is the same as preserving the nation's cultural treasures.

As for the culture that has emerged recently, the case being asked is about the trendy robes and veils. Do they wear these clothes and consider it a measure of piety or not? As many as 88.2% said no, and only 11.8% considered it a measure of piety. This data

shows that there is a slight cultural shift, from those who used to wear *sarungs*, caps, and *blangkon*, today wearing new symbols in the form of robes and veils which incidentally are not native to local culture. Although the percentage is small (11.8%), the respondents who answered this were very militant and consistent in defending it. So, it is possible that gradually the old religious culture (wearing *sarung*, *batik*, *blangkon*, cap, etc.), which is dominant and central to this day, will turn into a sub-dominant and peripheral culture in the future.

If the data above is read with the theory of cultural acculturation (Koentjaraningrat, 1994; Astuti, 2014), the intersection between local culture and Islamic teachings can be clustered into three. First, a culture that is affirmed and accepted because it is good and does not conflict with the substance of Islamic teachings. Second, the culture that was adopted with revisions, such as the *ṭawaf* culture. Third, rejected cultures, such as more than four marriages, and drinking alcohol. The culture was rejected because it was against Islam and had a negative impact on humanity.

In this regard, the existing religious cultures in Indonesia, such as *tahlilan*, *yasinan*, *walimahan*, *sekatenan*, *salametan*, and its kind, are the result of crossbreeding between Islamic teachings and local culture, which then form the distinctive traditions of the archipelago. Therefore, as long as it does not conflict with the main teachings of Islam, this good culture needs to be preserved as a distinctive feature of Indonesian Islam (Shihab, 2002).

This study confirms that the majority of the PIHE community are accommodative to local culture because these cultures do not

conflict with Islamic teachings. The figure is up to 53% which means it is quite good. Although there is still a minority group that has not been accommodative at 5%, this does not defeat the views and behavior of the majority.

### **Factors Affecting RM Implementation**

In general, two factors influence the implementation of the RM concept in the PIHE campus environment. There are internal and external factors. These two factors can be explained as follows:

#### ***Internal Factor***

The dominant internal factors influencing RM practice at PIHE are: (a) campus leadership support of 28.2%; (b) literacy of campus residents to RM 32.5%; (c) 25.6% campus community participation; (d) 4.6% budget fund; and (e) infrastructure 9.2%. In general, the data shows the low support from the campus academic community, from leaders, students, lecturers, and education staff. Both physical support, such as funding and infrastructure, and non-physical support, such as the preparation of pro-RM implementation policies.

Leadership that tends to be exclusive, elitist, and not visionary is an important factor that causes the slow process of RM implementation. Meanwhile, low literacy is caused by minimal interest in reading and references related to RM. Almost all campuses that are the research object do not provide authoritative and representative references regarding RM. The low support from campus residents is also due to their ignorance about the urgency of MB and the absence of standard rules that bind them.

One of the solutions that can be done to increase support internally is to share the perception about the importance of RM. Increase the supply of RM references and establish policies in the form of clear and binding rules for campus residents so that all components are willing to move to support the implementation of RM.

#### ***External Factors***

As for the external factors that influence the implementation of RM in the PIHE campus environment, there are 22.8% government support, 27.4% support from religious and community leaders; social, economic, and political conditions, 17.6%; the education level of the community around the campus is 13.5%; information and communication technology by 18.7%.

The data shows that all aspects of external support are categorized as lacking and even tend to be very lacking. In fact, the role of religious and community leaders is crucial because their voices are heard, and their advice is obeyed. Likewise, the government is the party that has the policy. If there is no siding with PIHE, then RM will only be a slogan without any implementation.

The same applies to social, economic and political aspects. The Covid-19 pandemic is one of the reasons for the lack of support for this aspect. Instead of being able to support PIHE in implementing RM, PIHE has taken on the negative impact of the turbulent social, economic, and political atmosphere during the pandemic. Weak information and communication technology and the hoax phenomenon that hit campus residents also influenced the implementation of RM.

## **CLOSING**

Based on the explanation above, it can be concluded as follows: First, the understanding of the PIHE academic community towards the RM concept is at a poor level of 34%. Second, the implementation of RM is quite good at the level of 53%. Third, internal and external factors affect the implementation of RM. It's just that the level of support from all of these factors is classified as lacking and tends to be significantly less, so it cannot encourage the RM implementation process properly and maximally in the PIHE environment.

There are four strategies used by PIHE to internalize RM: (1) insertion of RM into courses. Some courses used, for example, are Philosophy, Comparative Schools of Jurisprudence, Citizenship Education, Kalam Studies, Comparative Religion, *Maḍāhib Tafsir*, *Sirah Fiqh*, and *Sufism/Akhlak*. (2) organize RM training/workshops/seminars. (3) incorporate RM into the curriculum. Regarding this strategy, not all campuses

have complete RM curriculum documents, so internalization through this route cannot be measured. (4) through extracurricular activities. This extracurricular activity includes a hidden curriculum that is more effective for internalizing RM values in the academic community.

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